

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00099 01 OF 02 161941 Z

43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

----- 075653

O P 161830 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1867

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0099/1

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT MINI- PLENARY MARCH 16, 1973

1. SUMMARY. FIRST MINI- PLENARY HELD MARCH 16. JOHNSON SUMMARIZED GENERAL PRINCIPLES US BELIEVES SHOULD GUIDE EFFORT TO REACH PERMANENT OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD MAINTAIN PRESENT EXISTING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN TWO SIDES THROUGH EQUAL CEILINGS ON AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND AGGREGATE ICBM THROW- WEIGHT. HE ALSO REPEATED US VIEWS ON IMPORTANCE TO STABILITY OF EVIDENT SURVIVABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES AND THEIR EVIDENT ABILITY TO PENETRATE DEFENSES. SEMENOV SAID GOOD BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE ARMS IS PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY WHICH REQUIRES CONSIDERATION EXISTING STRATEGIC SITUATION TO INCLUDE GEOGRAPHIC PECULIARITIES, NUCLEAR- DELIVERY SYSTEMS ON THIRD- COUNTRY BASES AND OTHER APPROPRIATE FACTORS. JOHNSON PROPOSED THAT SIDES CONCENTRATE ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND IF AGREEMENT REACHED SEE WHETHER COMMON VIEW CAN THEN BE REACHED ON NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS. NEXT MINI- PLENARY MARCH 20. END SUMMARY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00099 01 OF 02 161941 Z

2. JOHNSON STATED THAT U. S. COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF GENEVA- I POINTED UP IMPORTANCE OF CLARIFYING BASIC IDEAS UNDERLYING SIDES' WORK. THEREFORE, APPROPRIATE TO SUMMARIZE GENERAL PRINCIPLES U. S. BELIEVES SHOULD GUIDE EFFORT TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT PROVIDING NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES EITHER SIDE. AFTER RECALLING U. S. STATEMENT THAT SALT OBJECTIVES ARE TO INCREASE SIDES' SECURITY BY ENHANCING STABILITY OF STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP IN ACCORD WITH PRINCIPLE OF NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, HE REAFFIRMED U. S. SUPPORT THESE OBJECTIVES.

3. JOHNSON THEN ADDRESSED PRINCIPLES IMPLIED BY OBJECTIVES OF NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. HE STATED HIS BELIEF BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT, EVEN THOUGH EACH SIDE, BECAUSE OF DIFFERING DESIGN APPROACHES AND GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS, HAS FOLLOWED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT LINES IN DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING ITS STRATEGIC ARAMENTS, THERE IS TODAY ESSENTIAL STRATEGIC EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN SIDES' FORCES. THUS, TASK IS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON LIMITATIONS WHICH WILL MAINTAIN THIS ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE. NOTING USE TERM "EQUIVALENCE" RATHER THAN "EQUALITY", JOHNSON SAID IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT SIDES TO HAVE IDENTICAL FORCES. U. S., AND PRESUMABLY USSR, WILL WANT TO AVOID RELYING ON SINGLE SYSTEM FOR DETERRENCE; IMPORTANCE THIS CONSIDERATION WILL CONTINUE AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN.

4. AFTER STATING THAT, IN LONGER TERM UNDER A PERMANENT AND MORE KOMPREHENSIVE OFFENSIVE AGREEMENT, PRESENT TECHNOLOGICAL ASYMMETRIES COULD CHANGE OR DISAPPEAR, HOHNSON SAID DESPITE SUCH CHANGE EACH SIDE MAY NEVERTHELESS VIEW STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY. THEREFORE, U. S. BELIEVES SOLUTION FOR ACHIEVING EQUIVALENCE WITH NON IDENTICAL FORCES IS EQUAL CEILINGS COVERING ESSENTIAL VERIFIABLE PARAMETERS OF STRATEGIC CAPABILITY, WITH APPROPRIATE FREEDOM TO MIX WITHIN CEILINGS GOVERNING THOSE PAREMETERS. PARAMETERS ARE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, WITHIN WHICH AGGREGATE A SUBCEILING SHOULD BE PROVIDED ON NUMBER ICBM LAUNCHERS AND A CEILING PROVIDED ON THE AGGREGATE THROW- WEIGHT ICBM FORCES. WITH RESPECT TO ROLE NON- CINTRAL SYSTEMS, JOHNSON REPEATED USG VIEW THAT "ASYMMETRIES IN NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS THAT AFFECT THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN US DO NOT FAVOR U. S."

5. JOHNSON THEN RECALLED SALT TWO-1 USDEL CONSIDERATION ON STABILITY CONCEPT, SPECIFICALLY THE IMPORTANCE TO STABILITY OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00099 01 OF 02 161941 Z

EVIDENT SURVIVABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES AND THEIR EVIDENT ABILITY TO PENETRATE DEFENSES. HE SAID STABILITY WILL BE UNDERMINED IF EITHER SIDE DEVELOPS ARMEMENTS LEADING TO CAPABILITY TO DESTROY OR NULLIFY CRITICAL PORTION OF OTHER SIDE'S DETERRENT FORCES. AN AGREEMENT ENHANCING SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES WOULD REDUCE PERCEPTION BY EITHER SIDE OF NECESSITY, OTHER THAN FOR MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT, FOR UNDERTAKING MAJOR NEW ARMS PROGRAMS TO AVOID BEING PLACED AT STRATEGIC DISADVANTAGE AND WOULD REDUCE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. CONFIDENCE IN ENDURING SURVIVABILITY STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IS ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF DETERRENCE AND A STABLE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP, THUS CONTRIBUTING TO EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL.

SECRET

ADP000

SECRET

PAGE 01 SALT T 00099 02 OF 02 162010 Z

43

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W

----- 075867

O P 161830 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1868

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0099/2

EXDIS SALT

6. TURNING TO CAPABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES TO PENETRATE DEFENSES, JOHNSON SAID STABILITY COULD BE SERIOUSLY ERODED IF ONE SIDE DEPLOYED DEFENSES WHICH WOULD REDUCE OTHER SIDE'S RETALIATORY CAPABILITY BELOW LEVEL JUDGED NECESSARY FOR DETERRENCE. MAJOR REASON FOR ABM TREATY WAS SIDES' RECOGNITION THAT DEVELOPMENT OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE BY ABM SYSTEMS, OR EVEN LONG TERM POTENTIAL PRESENTED BY SUCH POSSIBILITY, COULD UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN PENETRATION CAPABILITY OTHER SIDE'S MISSILE FORCES AND COULD CONSTITUTE SIGNIFICANT DESTABILIZING FACTOR. IN FORMULATING OFFENSIVE LIMITATIONS, SIDES SHOULD GIVE ATTENTION TO OTHER ASPECTS OF SUR-

VIVABILITY AND PENETRATION CAPABILITY OF STRATEGIC FORCES ACCORDING TO THEIR SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS.

7. JOHNSON RECALLED THAT IN SALT ONE-1 U. S. POINTED OUT CONNECTION BETWEEN NATURE OF VERIFICATION MEANS AVAILABLE TO SIDES AND SCOPE AND DEPTH OF CONSTRAINTS WHICH COULD BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. BOTH GOVERNMENTS ACCEPTED PROVISION ARTICLE XII ABM TREATY AND COROLLARIES OF MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF THAT PROVISION MUST BE CONTINUOUSLY BORNE IN MIND. JOHNSON CONCLUDED BY REITERATING VIEW IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SOVDEL CAN INDICATE ITS CONCURRENCE ON AS MANY OF THESE POINTS AS POSSIBLE AND, IN ANY CASE, MAKE CLEAR ITS POSITION ON THEM.

8. SEMENOV, AFTER NOTING THAT PRESENT PHASE IS CONCENTRATING ON PROBLEM OF WORKING OUT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00099 02 OF 02 162010 Z

TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SAID PRINCIPLES FIXED ON US- SOVIET SUMMIT DOCUMENTS ARE GOOD BASIS FOR SOLVING THIS TASK.

9. SEMENOV THEN CITED VARIOUS EXCERPTS FROM DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, ABM TREATY (PARAGRAPH IN PREAMBLE REFERRING TO REDUCTIONS) AND INTERIM AGREEMENT, PRINCIPLES OF WHICH NOT ONLY CREATED MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR ACTIVE TALKS ON LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS BUT ALSO FACILITATE DETENTE AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS. REALIZATION THESE PRINCIPLES IN REGARD QUESTIONS FACING TWO DELEGATIONS WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT FOR DEVELOPMENT US- USSR RELATIONS. HE THEN SAID THAT, IN SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, SIDES MUST BASE WORK ON PRINCIPLE EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, WHICH IS FIXED IN DOCUMENTS HE HAD CITED. THIS PRINCIPLE REQUIRES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EXISTING STRATEGIC SITUATION, TO INCLUDE PECULIARITIES OF SIDES' GEORGRAPHIC SITUATION, PRESENCE ON BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS ABLE TO STRIKE TARGETS ON OTHER SIDE'S TERRITORY, AS WELL AS OTHER APPROPRIATE FACTORS.

10. SUMMARIZING, SEMENOV SAID THAT, IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SIDES WOULD BE GUIDED BY PRINCIPLES FIXED IN DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND OTHER MOSCOW DOCUMENTS. IN DOING SO, SIDES PROCEED FROM PREMISE THAT ABM TREATY AND IA ARE IMPORTANT STEP IN CURBING AND FINALLY ENDING ARMS RACE, AND THAT THEIR LIMITATION AND GRADUAL REDUCTION ARE IN INTEREST BOTH COUNTRIES AND WORLD PEACE. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO FIND WAYS TO CONVERT THE IA INTO PERMANENT TREATY WITH APPROPRIATE EXPANSION OF ITS CONTENTS, TO MOVE FROM LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO THEIR GRADUAL REDUCTION, AND ESTABLISH LIMITS IN REGARD THEIR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT. MEASURES WILL BE

BASED ON PRINCIPLE EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES.

11. SEMENOV CONCLUDED THAT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES MUST BE EXTENDED ALSO TO THOSE TYPES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NOT ENCOMPASSED BY IA. SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM PREMISE THAT SALT, IN ADDITION TO ICBMS AND SLBMS, AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS, PERTAINS TO ANY TYPES OF MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT PERMITS THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON OTHER SIDE'S TERRITORY,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00099 02 OF 02 162010 Z

AS WELL AS NUCLEAR- CAPABLE CARRIER AVIATION REGARDLESS OF GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF ATTACK CARRIERS.

12. JOHNSON, AFTER NOTING HIS TWO STATEMENTS TO DATE DID NOT CONTRADICT ANY MOSCOW DOCUMENT PRINCIPLES, SAID SEMENOV HAD AGAIN TAKEN POSITION ON NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS WITH WHICH USDEL DISAGREES. THIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT CONSIDERATION CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND SEEKING COMMON GROUND ON THEM. HE PROPOSED THAT WE FIRST DEAL WITH CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND IF WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT ON THAT SUBJECT, SEE WHETHER COMMON VIEW CAN BE REACHED ON NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

13. SEMENOV, WHILE SAYING HE UNDERSTOOD US VIEWPOINT, BELIEVED SIDES SHOULD CONTINUE BY ELABORATING POSITIONS IN ORDER INTENDED. COMPARISON OF POSITIONS MAY REVEAL QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS SIDES MAY WANT TO CLARIFY. HE THOUGH SUCH A DEVELOPMENT OF TALKS MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO FINDING SOLUTIONS TO ASSIGNED TASK.

14. JOHNSON REPEATED THAT US IS ANXIOUS TO HEAR SOVIET VIEWS ON TODAY'S US STATEMENT. JOHNSON

SECRET

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** EXDIS

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 MAR 1973
DecapTION Date: 28 MAY 2004
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SALTT00099
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: XGDS-1
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SALT TALKS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730331/aaaahxkn.tel
Line Count: 265
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02-Aug-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <14-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> jms 971211
Subject: SALT MINI- PLENARY MARCH 16, 1973
TAGS: PARM
To: MOSCOW
NATO
SECSTATE WASHDC
SS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005